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Abstract:   
 
This article examines how Task Force votes were central to the development of DSM-III and 
DSM-III-R. Data were obtained through a literature review, investigation of DSM archival 
material housed at the American Psychiatric Association (APA), and interviews with key Task 
Force members of DSM-III and DSM-III-R.  Such data indicate that Task Force votes played 
a central role in the making of DSM-III, from establishing diagnostic criteria and diagnostic 
definitions to settling questions about the inclusion or removal of diagnostic categories. The 
article concludes that while the American Psychiatric Association represented DSM-III, and 
the return to descriptive psychiatry it inaugurated, as a triumph of empirically-based decision 
making, the evidence presented here fails to support that view. Since the DSM is a cumulative 
project, this article calls for a more socio-historically informed understanding of DSM’s 
construction to be deployed in how the DSM is taught and implemented in training and 
clinical settings. 
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The publication of DSM-III in 1980 was a response to diverse social-cultural and 
clinical pressures bearing on psychiatry in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Research 
by Rosenhan (1973) Cooper, et al., (1972) and Gurland (1972) had exposed the 
problem of low diagnostic reliability, giving impetus to those critics already arguing 
that psychiatric diagnosis was wrongly medicalizing many problems of living. Poor 
reliability also threatened psychiatry’s perceived capacity to provide reliable 
diagnostic data for the facilitation of psychotropic research; an issue heightened by 
the Thalidomide crisis in the early 1960s, which obliged the FDA to accept the need 
for randomized, placebo-controlled trials to prove drug safety and effectiveness 
(Junod 2008).
 
In addition, some insurers dissatisfied with the imprecision of DSM-II, 
now wanted a clearer and coded diagnostic system for reimbursement purposes; one 
that would also ideally better cohere with the codes in ICD-9. Finally, the growing 
number of non-medical mental health providers during the 1970s threatened 
psychiatry’s status and relevance, especially since low diagnostic reliability 
potentially discredited one of the linchpins of psychiatric research and practice. DSM-
III was therefore launched with the aim of creating an a-theoretical, empirically-based 
diagnostic system that would address the problems ensuing from the poor reliability 
besetting previous DSM editions. 
 
From the standpoint of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) the manual that 
ultimately emerged was a success. DSM-III’s scientific aura satisfied the regulators, 
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the insurers, the drug companies and also re-established what psychiatry could 
uniquely offer (Tietze 2014). From a scientific and clinical standpoint, however, 
many critics argued that DSM-III created as many problems as it purportedly solved, 
not for the profession but for prospective patients as it exacerbated the unnecessary 
medicalizing of much socially induced suffering, which in turn could lead to 
inappropriate and extensive prescribing of pharmaceuticals (Conrad 2007, 1992, 
Kutchins and Kirk 1998, Szasz 2007). They argued the text was a triumph of rhetoric 
not science, as the process of its construction was murky and its methods marred by 
too many subjective variables (Kirk and Kutchins 1992). It also, most importantly, 
failed to deliver on its raison d'être - solving the reliability problem – since its field 
trials revealed many of its categories to be hardly more reliable than those of DSM-II 
(Kutchins and Kirk 1986, 1994, Eysenck 1986, Scheff 1986). 
 
The extensive and now well-documented criticisms of DSM-III raise the question as 
to why, 35 years after its publication, people are still curious and critical regarding its 
construction. A number of factors can help explain this. The recent controversy over 
DSM-5 has renewed interest in the epistemological and methodological 
underpinnings of the broader DSM project, which are rooted to a large extent in 
DSM-III. In addition, as DSM-III broadly established the modern diagnostic system 
under which users of subsequent editions still largely operate, and as many of its 
diagnostic categories and criteria sets have significantly influenced those of DSM-IV 
and DSM-5, each edition builds cumulatively on the last making analysis of previous 
editions integral to any analysis of the total project. A further reason for the enduring 
interest in DSM-III is that much of the archival material regarding its construction 
still remains unread, unanalyzed and unpublished. Admittedly, some useful and 
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comprehensive archival-based studies have emerged since its publication, the most 
recent and notable being Hannah Decker’s (2103) The Making of DSM-III, which 
diligently charters the political maneuverings and controversies besetting DSM-III’s 
construction. Archival evidence also appears in historical and philosophical studies 
such as Edward Shorter’s (2009) illumination of the unscientific broadening of major 
depressive disorder, Mitchell Wilson’s (1993) analysis of how DSM narrowed 
psychiatry’s clinical gaze, Christopher Lane’s (2007) work on how shyness was 
reclassified as social anxiety disorder, and Rachel Cooper’s (2004) work on the extent 
to which DSM is ‘theory laden’.  
 
By and large, however, the extent and breath of the archival material (which extends, 
after all, to approximately 9 lineal feet) has ensured that much material of critical 
significance has remained un-sourced and unexamined. This is certainly true with 
respect to material pertaining to the extent to which Task Force votes were a primary 
mechanism by which deliberations and conclusions were settled on the Task Force, 
and in turn how the manual was constructed. This article will therefore illuminate this 
relatively neglected area through data obtained from firstly, previously unpublished 
archival materials sourced at the APA archives in Arlington VA., and secondly, from 
data gathered through interviews with members of, and consultants to, the DSM-III 
and III-R Task Forces.  
 
Composition of the Task Force for DSM-III: 
Work officially commenced on DSM-III in 1974. Its original Task Force, ratified by 
the American Psychiatric Association’s Council of Research and Development, relied 
exclusively on the Task Force’s Chairman, Robert Spitzer, to select and appoint its 
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members (Decker 2013: 148). Initially the Task Force comprised eight members 
whom Spitzer chose because of their “special interest in various aspects of diagnosis” 
(DSM 1980: 2). These members were: Nancy C. Andreasen (psychiatrist); Robert 
Spitzer (psychiatrist); Theodore Millon (psychologist); Donald F. Klein (psychiatrist); 
Henry Pinsker  (psychiatrist); Jean Endicott (psychologist); George Saslow 
(psychiatrist - deceased); Robert A. woodruff   (psychiatrist - deceased); Morton 
Kramer (biometrician - deceased). The text editor was Janet B. W. Williams. 
 
The Task Force’s purpose was to decide all matters related to how the manual would 
be researched and compiled. It would evaluate all proposals for DSM-III stemming 
from advisory committees, liaison committees, professional organizations within the 
APA and participants in the DSM-III Field Trials. The Task Force also aimed to 
represent the profession’s diversity, which led to its expansion as work progressed. As 
the introduction to DSM-III states, “additional members were added to ensure 
representation of different perspectives and areas of expertise” (DSM 1980:2).  
Indeed, at its height the Task Force comprised 15 members largely from various sub-
fields of psychiatry. Whether this expansion sufficiently represented the diversity of 
views within psychiatry and the broader mental health professions remained moot. 
Early on the Chair of the APA’s council on R and D expressed to Spitzer concern 
about the absence of “minority members”, a concern also articulated by the 
Committee of Black Psychiatrists, who had no Task Force representation (Decker 
2013: 148). Psychoanalytic presence was also kept to a minimum, which later 
generated protest from the America Psychoanalytic Association. In short, the Task 
Force essentially comprised white, middle-class Americans all, bar one, from the 
disciplines of psychiatry and psychology. There was no representation from non-
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white, American or middle class groups, and no intellectual presence from the social 
sciences or humanities. Spitzer’s Task Force was therefore not only culturally and 
ideologically kindred but also agreed with his broader vision for DSM-III: it should 
reverse the psychoanalytic tendency (dominating DSM-II) to de-emphasise diagnostic 
classification in favour of studying the nature and source of intra-psychic conflicts; it 
should be noncommittal on aetiology, be avowedly descriptive, and should create 
criteria sets for each disorder in service of securing higher diagnostic reliability.  
 
That the Task Force was unanimous on the aims of DSM-III was clear at its first 
meeting, as one original member Nancy Andreason later reflected: “When all 
members of the task force had finished speaking [i.e. setting out their aims], they were 
clearly astonished at the extent to which they agreed with one another” (Decker 2013: 
108). Of course such agreement was not coincidental, but a product of Spitzer’s 
design. Such design was particularly important given the procedures the Task Force 
adopted to decide the manual’s multi-axial structure, criteria sets, diagnostic 
definitions as well as what disorders to include and/or remove. As neurobiological 
research played almost no role in guiding how the Task Force settled the 
aforementioned matters, other procedures were adopted to facilitate the conclusions 
the Task Force reached. In the following statement, for instance, Spitzer clarifies 
during interview the procedural grounds upon which 80 disorders were newly added 
to DSM-III:  
  
[As] psychiatry is unable to depend on biological markers to justify including 
disorders in the DSM, we looked for other things - behavioural, 
psychological - we had other procedures….Our general principle was that if 
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a large enough number of clinicians felt that a diagnostic concept was 
important in their work then we were likely to add it as a new category. That 
was essentially it. It became a question of how much consensus there was to 
recognize and include a particular disorder (Interview with author 2012). 
 
It is important to note that the word “consensus” does not necessarily denote the 
consensus of the wider psychiatric or mental health community. While it was 
certainly true that wider consensus was tested and sought among psychiatrists (i.e. 
through questionnaires petitioning selected APA members for views on certain Task 
Force proposals), the consensus that really mattered was that reached by the Task 
Force itself, whose prime occupation was to be the final arbiter of any proposed 
change or inclusion. Task Force consensus could therefore overrule that attained by 
any advisory committee, lobbying faction or group, a privilege extensively exercised 
since the demands of different groups would often be at variance, and since the 
research guiding Task Force decisions was on most matters inconclusive, minimal 
and/or contradictory, as we will see. Nonetheless, of the research that did exist, its 
species can be ascertained from archival material held at the APA and from 
interviews with Task Force members. Such research fell into three categories:  
 
 Questionnaire data gathered via consultation with APA members.  
 Existing theoretical or research papers that defined or discussed particular 
disorders and/or made claims for their wider acceptance.  
 Field trials testing the reliability of proposed disorders. 
 
 8 
As the problems with the field trials have been extensively studied elsewhere 
(Kutchins and Kirk 1986, 1994), here we will focus on the Task Force’s consultation 
of questionnaire data and research or theoretical papers. That is, we will focus upon 
those species of research that helped establish disorders for which reliability was later 
tested.  
 
The Evidence-Base  
To provide an example of the nature of such research, it is instructive to first consider 
the case of Self-Defeating Personality Disorder (SDPD), which was proposed for 
inclusion in DSM-III-R and which was ultimately defined as characterizing a 
pervasive pattern of self-defeating behavior, beginning in early adulthood, and 
leading the person to avoid pleasurable experiences and seek out situations or 
relationships in which they would suffer (DSM 1980: 371). This case is important 
because the controversy surrounding SDPD’s proposed inclusion led to its evidence-
base being more thoroughly scrutinized than that for almost any other disorder. Extant 
archival material shows that spirited discussions between the Task Force and 
consulted critics of SDPD continued until its final inclusion in the appendix of DSM-
III-R. Among the critics of SDPD was the Harvard-based psychologist, Paula Caplan, 
who advised the Task Force on its proposed inclusion but who argued that some of 
the self-defeating traits proposed as characterizing SDPD were also said to be typical 
of women who were victims of violence. The diagnosis, it was argued, was therefore 
dangerous as it could potentially pathologise such women and, at worst, be used in 
courts of law to suggest that female victims of violence were in fact inviting abuse 
upon themselves (because they were pathologically disposed to seek out abusive 
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relationships). This in turn could lead to perpetrators of violence being acquitted on 
the grounds they were simply complying with their victims’ requests.  
 
In the minutes for an undated meeting we hear Task Force members discussing what 
to make of these criticisms. The Task Force’s conclusion is that while the critics were 
correct to point out that the inclusion of SDPD was a politically fraught issue, they 
were wrong to suggest the diagnosis might wrongly stigmatise female victims of 
abuse:  
 
Robert Spitzer: They (the women) present a narrow-gauged but persuasive 
argument. Their powerful argument is that it is a political hot potato. The 
feminist issue is a false issue [i.e. that this diagnosis could pathologies female 
victims of violence]. 
 
Fink: Women’s arguments seem irrelevant to questions on the table. Are they 
obscuring their own good arguments? [The ‘good arguments’ being that SDPD 
is a controversial diagnosis; the ‘irrelevant arguments’ being those above 
posed by Caplan].  
 
Benedek - No empirical basis for category. But you’re right – arguments aren’t 
responsive to questions. 
 
Cynthia Rose - we do great disservice by backing off and not acknowledging 
that this pattern is pathological (Minutes of meeting, undated, Archives, DSM 
Coll. American Psychiatric Association, Washington D. C.).  
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Before electing to include SDPD in DSM-III-R, the decision was made to undertake 
further research into SDPD. Once such research was conducted, it was later 
scrutinised by Caplan, who discovered it only comprised two studies. The first was 
conducted by Spitzer himself, and entailed a group of psychiatrists at only one 
university who already accepted SDPD existed, being shown some old case studies 
(Caplan 1995: 102). All unanimously agreed the patients in them had SDPD. Caplan 
argued that just because some psychiatrists at one hospital diagnosed their patients 
with SDPD was not proof that the disorder actually exists. “All Spitzer’s research 
proves is that a group of psychiatrists working in the same institution gave the same 
label – rightly or wrongly - to a given set of behaviours” (Caplan 1995: 205-6). 
 
The second piece involved sending out a questionnaire to a selected number of 
members of the APA asking them whether the diagnosis SDPD should be included in 
the DSM. If they voted ‘yes’ then they were asked to describe what they thought the 
characteristics of SDPD were. If they voted ‘no’ then they were asked to return the 
questionnaire, blank, without any clinical data. This meant that the only data gathered 
about the characteristics of SDPD was data obtained from people who believed in the 
existence of SDPD in the first place. An official report later conducted by the 
psychologists Kutchins and Kirk showed that only 11 percent of those who returned 
the questionnaire described what they thought the characteristics of SDPD were 
(1997). So essentially only 11 percent voted ‘yes’, constituting an unrepresentative 
sample of the psychiatric community (Kutchins and Kirk, 1997). 
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As the research basis for SDPD was my most accounts weak, it is important to assess 
whether this was just an isolated example or whether the evidence-base for other 
disorders was more robust and extensive. Theodore Millon, a central of the Task 
Force, addressed this issue when discussing the nature, extent and type of research the 
Task Force relied upon to reach decisions:  
 
There was very little systematic research, and much of the research that existed 
was really a hodgepodge—scattered, inconsistent, and ambiguous. I think the 
majority of us recognized that the amount of good, solid science upon which we 
were making our decisions was pretty modest (Angell 2009: 29). 
 
Sptizer echoed this concern after my reading Millon’s statement during interview:  
 
Well its true that for many of the disorders that were added, there wasn’t a 
tremendous amount of research, and certainly there wasn’t research on the 
particular way that we defined these disorders. In the case of Millon’s quote, I 
think he is mainly referring to the personality disorders……But again, it is 
certainly true that the amount of research validating data on most psychiatric 
disorders is very limited indeed (Interview with author, 2012).  
 
Spitzer then re-emphasised how there was little research not only supporting the 
inclusion of new disorders, but also supporting how these disorders should be defined: 
 
There are very few disorders whose definition was a result of specific research 
data. For borderline personality disorder there was some research that looked at 
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different ways of defining the disorder. And we chose the definition that seemed 
to be the most valid. But for the other categories rarely could you say that there 
was research literature supporting the definition’s validity (Interview with author, 
2012). 
 
Given that Spitzer identifies borderline personality disorder (BDP) as one of the few 
disorders whose definition was informed by ‘some research’, it would be useful to 
inspect what that research comprised. Firstly, while Spitzer’s understanding of BDP 
was highly influenced by clinicians such as Otto Kernberg, Task Force deliberations 
about how to define and set criteria for BPD transpired periodically for two years 
without any clear resolution being reached (Decker 2013: 195-202). Henry Pinsker, a 
member of the original Task Force and the Personality Disorders Work Group, 
recalled in interview how this impasse was ultimately overcome:  
 
I can remember an early discussion about Borderline, and Spitzer’s response was 
something like ‘I just don’t know what it is’ - but it was a diagnosis that doctors 
were making. It was only when John Gunderson came up with a paper listing 
specific characteristics of what he called Borderline Personality Disorder, that we 
went ‘ah ha – we can put this in book’. So the Borderline that went into the DSM 
was based on Gunderson’s paper written sometime in the 1970s (Interview with 
author, 2013). 
 
When we consult John G. Gunderson’s paper today we find it documents what he and 
his co-author believed to be the six defining features of BPD given their interpretation 
of the existing literature (Gunderson and Singer, 1975). While their review is 
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comprehensive in its scope, it does not transcend the usual methodological problems 
of review-based research, which is susceptible to interpretation bias and unable to 
control for the multiple variables affecting each study reviewed. Being aware of these 
methodological difficulties Gunderson later stated: “It had been my expectation at the 
time this review was completed that it would largely serve as a spring-board for future 
empirical studies which I intended to do” (Gunderson 1983). What Gunderson had 
not anticipated was the seminal role it would play in defining – via DSM - how BPD 
would be diagnosed and researched for the next 20 years.  
 
While Gunderson’s article significantly shaped the DSM’s definition of BPD, it was 
not adopted without amendment. Further changes were discussed and implemented by 
the Task Force in consultation with Gunderson himself. Since the archival material on 
these discussions is largely absent from the archives, we are forced to gain a general 
sense of how such discussions unfolded through the recollections of members. In 
what follows, Henry Pinsker elaborated during interview on the processes governing 
not only how the definition BPD was settled, but also on how the definitions of all 
disorders were reached during Task Force meetings:  
 
We simply discussed things until we were comfortable with it, based on what we 
as individual members of the group understood and knew. It was really quite 
primitive compared to what they do now – you know, you read about this DSM-5 
Task Force with everything organized around data and studies, whether it be 
statistical studies or genetic studies, and reconciling this data with that data. We 
didn’t know about this. It was all about what we knew from clinical experience 
and from reading. That was it. It was done by consensus of experts, which would 
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now be considered a very trivial approach, but that’s the best we could do then 
(Interview with author, 2013). 
 
While critics would dispute the levels of robustness Pinsker ascribes to the 
construction of subsequent DSM editions, when we place his comments alongside 
those of Spitzer, Millon and Caplan the picture emerges of a Task Force struggling to 
substantiate its decisions on the basis of solid research. Donald Klein, another 
member of the original Task Force, also confirmed this struggle in interview:  
 
We had very little in the way of data, so we were forced to rely on clinical 
consensus, which, admittedly, is a very poor way to do things. But it was better 
than anything else we had (Interview with author, 2012). 
 
Klein then described how such meetings typically unfolded when consensus was 
sought in the absence of guiding research:  
 
We thrashed it out, basically. We had a three-hour argument. There would be 
about twelve people sitting down at the table, usually there was a chairperson 
and there was somebody taking notes. And at the end of each meeting there 
would be a distribution of events. And at the next meeting some would agree 
with the inclusion, and the others would continue arguing. If people were still 
divided, the matter would be eventually decided by a vote…that is how it went 
(Interview with author, 2012). 
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Henry Pinsker also confirms the Task Force’s reliance on voting, especially when 
disagreements ensued:  
 
I don’t have specific recollections, some things were discussed over a number 
of different meetings, [which would sometimes be] followed by an exchange of 
memoranda about it, and then there would simply be a vote… people would 
raise hands, there weren’t that many people (Interview with author, 2012). 
 
Regarding the legitimacy of this method Pinsker continued: “We never had any 
question that that is how we would proceed. I had no reservations at all about working 
that way”. On such taskforce meetings, according to Pinsker, there was “certainly 
more consensus than there was closely contested votes”. He continued: “if there was 
considerable discussion the outcome would be: yeh okay, that makes sense let’s do it 
that way. I think it was more that kind of discussion, than, alright, let’s stop 
discussing it and put it to a vote” (Interview with author, 2013). 
 
The documentary evidence somewhat contradicts Pinsker’s claims about how 
regularly votes were cast, because it shows that Pinsker did not attend all Task Force 
meetings and so cannot be considered a reliable source on the frequency of votes. 
Furthermore, Pinsker was not privy too all the voting conducted on conference calls 
(Decker 2013: 195), and later through the use of ballot letters. Finally, from 
inspecting the 12 extant minuted Task Force meetings in the APA archives, we find 
that voting took place in 10 of them. These votes were undertaken on all manner of 
proposals. For instance, the minutes of votes conducted on the Task Force on 4
th
 Oct 
1978 include statements such as: 
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The taskforce voted to approve a statement drafted after a meeting with the 
committee on Confidentiality, stating that the first three axes of DSM-III will 
constitute the official diagnosis, and axes VI and V may be used in ‘special 
clinical, education and teaching settings’ (Minutes of Task Force Meeting Oct 
4
th
 1978, Archives, DSM Coll. American Psychiatric Association, Washington 
D. C.). 
 
In the same meeting the Task Force also voted to change the name Introverted 
Personality Disorder to Schizoid Personality Disorder; to sustain the names of 
Borderline Personality Disorder, Compulsive Personality Disorder and Passive 
Aggressive Personality Disorder; they also voted to leave Emancipation Disorder ‘in 
for the time being’; to name Chronic Affective Disorders as Chronic Hypomanic 
Disorder, Chronic Depressive Disorder and Cyclothymia. They also voted to expand 
the definition of Cyclothymic Disorder to include swings of mood of short (hours) 
duration and voted to include Hysteriod Dysphoria under Atypical Affective 
Disorders. Finally, as the minutes state: ‘In the course of a rather heated discussion it 
because clear that (there were questions regarding) the placement and content of 
Schizoaffective Disorder. In a straw vote the Task Force indicated the desirability of 
maintaining a separate code for Schizoaffective Disorder’ (Minutes of Task Force 
Meeting Oct 4
th
 1978, Archives, DSM Coll. American Psychiatric Association, 
Washington D. C.). 
 
It is regrettable that today we possess only the minuted conversations that preceded 
each vote rather than recorded ones, as it is difficult to ascertain from minutes the 
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precise time spent in deliberating any proposal before a vote was cast. Nonetheless, 
the minutes do suggest that such discussions were often of only short duration. For 
instance, in an undated minuted document we find a typical example of how pre-
voting discussions unfolded. Here the Task Force was trying to decide the diagnostic 
criteria for the diagnosis of Substance Dependence:  
 
How many items do you need for a diagnosis of (substance) dependence? 
 
Robbins – persistent cognitive or physical impairment after stopping 
substance use. 
 
Senay – items for amount of substance consumed. 
 
Maybe in text say something about how some subjects can’t give the 
information, but if they have some common complication such as cirrhosis, 
one can assume that meets other criteria. 
 
Jaffe – other evidence for other drug abuse, such as needle tracks enable you 
to make a diagnosis without meeting criteria….perforated nasal septum, 
Korsakoffs, etc. 
 
Signs and symptoms that are presumptive evidence of use in the past.  
 
Solution: 3 out of 10 symptoms, or any of (a list of medical complications 
that are definitive evidence of excessive use in the past) ((Minutes of Task 
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Force Meeting, undated, Archives, DSM Coll. American Psychiatric 
Association, Washington D. C.). 
 
Rarely do the minutes indicate on what grounds any individual participant lobbied for 
a particular inclusion or position. The minutes mostly document the lobbying 
statements, not the corroborating research upon which they were supposedly based. 
While this does not mean that corroborating research was never discussed on the Task 
Force, it does raise the question about the extent to which opinions were advanced 
(and indeed realized) without the evidence-base being scrutinized during meetings. 
That Task Force discussions could regularly stray from the evidence-base, leading to 
outcomes that were arbitrary, was concerning to at least one leading member of Task 
Force itself. In a previously unpublished letter written by Donald Klein to Robert 
Spitzer, Klein expresses serious concern about how Spitzer, unconstrained by decisive 
evidence, was allowing himself to be to easily guided by personal preference:  
 
I think that this revision (of DSM-III) in general suffers from problems in 
deciding the overall criteria for accepting or rejecting a [diagnostic] category. 
 
At times you take the stand that if a large group of respected clinicians agree that 
something exists descriptively then they should be deferred to [i.e. 
included]….At other times you take the stand that if something has not shown 
itself to be demonstrably valuable then it should go out [i.e. be removed]…. If 
this criterion were evenhandedly applied, DSM III would shrink substantially [i.e. 
because many disorders have not shown themselves to be demonstrably valuable] 
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And yet at other times you seem to feel that categories that actually have the 
support of a large group of clinicians…should not be accepted, because somehow 
or other they just don’t fit... 
 
Without agreement on these overarching issues, it is not surprising that there’s a 
lot of disagreement with regard to particular categories (Letter from Donald F. 
Klein to Robert Spitzer, March 19th 1986. Archives, DSM Coll, American 
Psychiatric Association, Washington D. C.). 
1
 
 
One of the mechanisms by which Spitzer managed such disagreements was consulting 
relevant leaders in the field. Indeed, the APA archives contain many hundreds of 
letters evidencing the huge amount of time and energy expended in such 
communications. These letters contain views being traded back and forth between 
Spitzer and colleagues on matters as diverse as developing diagnostic definitions, 
refining diagnostic criteria, and distinguishing separate categories. Not all such 
correspondence led to concrete inclusions or even amendments, as it was at the 
discretion of Spitzer and to a lesser extent his Task Force as to whether any given 
suggestion would be accepted for vote. However, when Spitzer was particularly 
impressed by the views of a correspondent that person would sometimes be asked to 
either take up advisory role or to meet Spitzer for a face-to-face meeting. As to why 
Spitzer would approve some suggestions rather than others, can now only be 
considered on a case-by-case basis given what we know about his clinical and 
theoretical beliefs and what extant archival and interview data is able to reveal. What 
we can ascertain with greater accuracy, however, is how some such face-to-face 
meetings sometimes unfolded. In an article published by Alix Spiegel, for example, 
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we gain important insight into how two new disorders (‘factitious disorder’ and ‘brief 
reactive psychosis’), entered DSM-III through such consultations. We also learn how 
freely Robert Spitzer was prepared to act alone, creating singlehandedly diagnostic 
criteria and definitions later put to Task Force vote. The excerpt is worth quoting in 
full: 
 
Roger Peele and Paul Luisada, psychiatrists at St. Elizabeths Hospital, in 
Washington, D.C., wrote a paper in which they used the term “hysterical 
psychoses” to describe the behavior of two kinds of patients they had observed: 
those who suffered from extremely short episodes of delusion and hallucination 
after a major traumatic event, and those who felt compelled to show up in an 
emergency room even though they had no genuine physical or psychological 
problems. Spitzer read the paper and asked Peele and Luisada if he could come 
to Washington to meet them. During a forty-minute conversation, the three 
decided that “hysterical psychoses” should really be divided into two disorders. 
Short episodes of delusion and hallucination would be labelled “brief reactive 
psychosis,” and the tendency to show up in an emergency room without 
authentic cause would be called “factitious disorder.” “Then Bob asked for a 
typewriter,” Peele says. To Peele’s surprise, Spitzer drafted the definitions on 
the spot. “He banged out criteria sets for factitious disorder and for brief 
reactive psychosis, and it struck me that this was a productive fellow! He comes 
in to talk about an issue and walks away with diagnostic criteria for two 
different mental disorders!” Both factitious disorder and brief reactive psychosis 
were included in the DSM-III with only minor adjustments (Spiegel 2005). 
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DSM-III was published in 1980, and while its global influence on mental health 
research and practice had been assured by the end of the 1980s, the central 
mechanisms by which it was established remained largely unknown to most 
professionals and the public alike. As the decade unfolded considerable uncertainty 
grew concerning the extent to which biological evidence or solid research supported 
the definitions of the disorders contrived, the validity of the disorders included, and 
the symptom thresholds people must meet to receive the diagnosis. Most 
professionals did not know that such matters were not established upon a clear 
evidence-base, but were the product of committee consensus, which, at best, reflected 
the well-meaning and culturally-embedded professional opinions of a small subset of 
psychiatrists. Indeed, as Spitzer stated in interview: ‘Our team was certainly not 
typical of the psychiatry community, and that was one of the major arguments against 
DSM III: it allowed a small group with a particular viewpoint to take over psychiatry 
and change it in a fundamental way’. When asking Spitzer what he made of that 
criticism, he responded: “What did I think of that charge? - Well, it was absolutely 
true. It was a revolution, that’s what it was. We took over because we had the power” 
(interview with author, 2012).  
 
The prevalence of such methodological problems sits uneasily with the manner in 
which the APA still represents the construction of DSM-III. Statements made by the 
APA today still stress, for example, that DSM-III’s construction was “facilitated by 
extensive empirical work on the construction and validation of explicit diagnostic 
criteria” (APA 2014), and elsewhere that “many revisions appearing in DSM-III-R 
were based on over 2,000 scientific publications which cited DSM-III” (Halleck et al., 
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1992). The suggestion that DSM-III was rigorously evidence-based jars with both the 
interview and archival data set down above.  
 
 
DSM-III’s influence on DSM-IV: 
In 1994 Spitzer’s DSM was replaced by DSM-IV. During two separate interviews in 
2012 with DSM-IV’s chairperson, Allen Frances, he discussed the extent to which 
DSM-IV departed from its preceding edition, DSM-III: 
 
DSM IV was a remarkably unambitious and modest effort to stabilize psychiatric 
diagnosis, and not to create new problems. This meant keeping the introduction 
of new disorders to an absolute minimum (interview with author, 2012). 
 
Here Frances is referring to the Task Force adding only eight new disorders to the 
main manual, which is a modest amount considering that Spitzer’s Task Force 
introduced eighty. From another standpoint, however, Frances’ claim that ‘new 
disorders were keep to an absolute minimum’, ignores that DSM-IV placed an 
additional 30 new disorders in the appendix for ‘further study’, and re-coded and 
subdivided many existing disorders. When including these appendix disorders and 
subdivisions, all of which patients can be diagnosed with, Frances’s Task Force 
actually expanded the DSM from 292 to 374 disorders.  
 
Where Frances’ claim to modesty stands up to further scrutiny is in noticing that the 
DSM-IV Task Force only significantly reformulated four of the 292 disorders 
inherited from DSM-III-R. This meant that most of DSM-III’s categories were 
 23 
imported into DSM-IV without significant alteration. When reflecting on why so 
much of DSM-III was transferred wholesale into DSM-IV, Frances was explicit about 
the rationale:  
 
If we were going to either add new diagnosis or eliminate existing ones there 
had to be substantial scientific evidence to support that decision. And there 
simply wasn’t. So by following our own conservative rules we couldn’t reduce 
the system anymore than we could increase it. Now, you could argue that is a 
questionable approach, but we felt it was important to stabilise the system and 
not make arbitrary decisions in either direction (interview with author, 2012). 
 
An obvious question regarding this rationale is whether it wrongly assumed that the 
disorders DSM-III included, their definitions and criteria sets, were themselves 
established on a robust evidence base? Frances addressed this issue in the following 
way: 
 
We did not assume that at all. We knew that everything that came before was 
arbitrary [Frances corrected himself]; we knew that most decisions that came 
before were arbitrary. I had been involved in DSM III. I understood its limitations 
probably more than most people did. But, the most important value at that time, 
was to stabalise the system not change it arbitrarily... it felt better to stabalise the 
existing arbitrary decisions than to create a whole assortment of new ones 
(interview with author, 2012). 
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Frances’s admissions, coupled with textual comparisons of both manuals, indicate 
that the influence of DSM-III did not wane after 1994. Its influence lived on in three 
central ways: by establishing and normalising the procedures of voting and consensus 
upon which later editions also came to depend; by providing the benchmark against 
which changes were made by subsequent Task Forces; and by establishing most of the 
disorder definitions and criteria sets still in use today. While it is beyond the scope of 
this article to document the many diagnostic reformulations that were conducted over 
DSM-IV, DSM-IV-R and DSM-5, as well as to discuss the removal the multiaxial 
system from DSM-5, knowledge of the procedures by which DSM-III and DSM-III-R 
were developed suggests that critical scrutiny of subsequent manuals should not 
solely focus on the merits or demerits of newly introduced changes, as has been 
largely the case with criticisms of DSM-5, but also upon the extent to which 
deploying and incorporating DSM-III-based procedures and categories was legitimate 
by any robust empirical standard. In short, important questions still remain about the 
viability of the DSM’s cumulative method, insofar as what has been accumulated over 
consecutive editions was the product of processes to prone to error.   
 
Conclusion 
While it is broadly accepted among most socio-cultural scholars of psychiatry that the 
DSM is a culturally constructed document (e.g. Gaines 1992; Littlewood 1992; Good 
1996; Kleinman 2012), solid empirical evidence concerning the centrality of voting-
based consensus has, interestingly, remained elusive. This article has attempted to 
redress this omission by expanding the evidence-base concerning the centrality and 
prevalence of voting on DSM Task Forces, thus substantiating that the contrivance of 
DSM categories was largely facilitated by invested cultural negotiation, rather 
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than by the consultation of what today’s research environment would regard as 
satisfactory empirical evidence. Where this article therefore makes its contribution 
is by sourcing new oral and archival data illustrating that the separate disorders into 
which DSM-III organized diverse behavioral and mental phenomena were largely the 
outcome of vote-based judgments settled by a small, culturally-homogenous subset of 
mental health professionals who were socially positioned at a given moment in 
psychiatric history to have their judgments ratified by the institutional apparatus of 
the APA. While such judgments may indicate that some professionals with similar 
socio-cultural beliefs and interests see some things in the same way at given point in 
time, they do not confirm that what they see is either objectively true or stable in any 
verifiable sense. So while the extensive time and dedication invested in the making of 
DSM-III may warrant professional respect, the finished product does not warrant 
uncritical deference insofar as further analysis may reveal more about the professional 
and broader culture of its particular creators than about the phenomena upon which 
they pronounced.  
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1 Documents such as these, coupled with the interview data gathered by Alex 
Speigal (2005) and the executive power afforded to Robert Spitzer by the APA to 
decide the composition of the Task Force and working groups and to determine 
what subjects came before the Task Force for scrutiny, suggests that DSM III 
significantly reflected the opinions and preferences of this single individual. 
 
 
